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Wentworth: Gift Inter Vivos: What Constitutes Delivery?
CASE COMMENTS
ing an airport; 2 5 providing a water system; 2 6 building parks and playgrounds; 2'7 conducting a budget commission; 28 regulating the use of
improved highways; 2 9 and providing for a closed season on fresh water
fish.3O
The Florida Constitution is not a grant of power but a limitation thereof; therefore, the Legislature may enact any law not expressly or inferentially prohibited. 31 As to powers which a county may exercise, if conferred
32
by statute, no express limitations are present in the Florida Constitution.
There is, however, an indirect restriction by reason of the prohibition on
county tax fund usage for other than county purposes. 3 3 Were it not for
this provision there could be little doubt of the validity of this statute.
From the foregoing court determinations of county purposes and the broad
language therein used, it is evident that regulation of a public utility furnishing electricity, which is absolutely vital to the public welfare, is a
valid county purpose.
CLAuDE K. SLAThm

GIFT INTER VIVOS: WHAT
CONSTITUTES DELIVERY?
Harvey v. Hubbard, 38 So.2d 303 (Fla. 1948)
Plaintiff claimed the proceeds of a mortgage as a gift from decedent,
with whom she had resided as housekeeper for approximately ten years
prior to his death. The written assignment upon which her claim rested
"State v. County of Monroe, 148 Fla. 111, 3 So.2d 754 (1941).
"'Board of County Comm'rs Pinellas County v. Herrick, 123 Fla. 619, 167 So. 386

(1936).
"Duval County v. Bancroft, 96 Fla. 128, 117 So. 799 (1928).
-"Sparkman v. County Budget Comm'n, 103 Fla. 242, 137 So. 809 (1931).
2'Zackary v. Morris, 78 Fla. 316, 82 So. 830 (1919).
"Ex parte Lewis, 101 Fla. 624, 135 So. 147 (1931).
"State v. Board of Public nstr'n, 126 Fla. 142, 170 So. 602 (1936); Harry E.
Prettyman, Inc. v. Florida Real Estate Conm'n ex rel. Branham, 92 Fla. 515, 109 So.
442 (1926); Stone v. State, 71 Fla. 514, 71 So. 634 (1916); Cotten v. Leon County

Comm'rs, 6 Fla. 610 (1856).
32

.A. CoNsT. Art. VII, §5.

"FLA. CoNsT. Art. IX, §5.
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was signed and sealed two years prior to the assignor's decease. After his
death it was found with the mortgage and note in a safe deposit box originally rented by decedent, to which one of his daughters and the claimant
had been given access subsequent to a stroke suffered shortly before his
death. Plaintiff instituted suit under Florida's Declaratory Judgment
Act 1 and a decree was entered in her favor. On appeal by the administrator, HELD, title to the mortgage and note was in plaintiff and the proceeds must be surrendered to her. Affirmed for plaintiff without a majority opinion, Chief Justice Thomas and Justices Chapman and Sebring
dissenting.
The principle is well established in Florida, as in other jurisdictions,
that two essential elements must be proved in order to establish a gift inter
vivos: (1) a clear intention of the donor to transfer a present interest, and
(2) delivery by complete surrender of dominion and control to the donee.2
Since a written assignment was signed by the decedent in the present case,
it is clear that he intended that his housekeeper should have the mortgage
at some time.3 It is questionable, however, whether he intended at any
time to pass a present interest, since he expressly directed that the assignment be withheld from record and failed to notify either the mortgagor or
the insurance company, whose policy on the premises contained a mortgage
clause payable to him.
The fundamental question is the adequacy of proof of delivery. The
Florida Supreme Court has affirmed the rule that delivery of a deed or
written assignment passes title to the chose in action without delivery of
the original instrument.4 Two primary factors to be considered are the
assignor's reservation of beneficial interest, and the alleged donee's right of
entry to the safe deposit box. As to the former, the continued collection
of interest is not inconsistent per se with the idea of an executed gift of
the principal when some present interest passes to the donee. 5 Access to
the place of deposit, or even possession of the property, 6 however, is not
1

FLA. STAT., C. 87 (1941).

'Hudgens v. Tillman, 227 Ala. 672, 151 So. 863 (1934); Crossman v. Naphtali, 33
So.2d 726 (Fla. 1948) ; Webster v. St. Petersburg Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n, 155 Fla.
412, 20 So.2d 400 (1945) ; Jones v. Ferguson, 150 Fla. 313, 7 So.2d 464 (1942) ; Hodges
v. Atlantic Nat. Bank of Jacksonville, 134 Fla. 702, 184 So. 875 (1938) ; McClellan v.
McCauley, 158 Miss. 456, 130 So. 145 (1930).
'Horn v. Gartman, 1 Fla. 63 (1846).
'Garner v. Bemis, 81 Fla. 60, 87 So. 426 (1921).
5
Roe v. Roe, 98 Fla. 840, 124 So. 734 (1929); In re King, 115 App. Div. 751, 100
N. Y. Supp. 1089 (1906).
'Stigletts v. McDonald, 135 Fla. 385, 186 So. 233 (1938).
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alone sufficient to sustain an inference of delivery, 7 although such a circumstance may operate in conjunction with other facts to establish the
gift. 8
By the claimant's own testimony, she had possession of the assignment
only for deposit in the bank at her employer's direction. The circuit court
relied upon this as showing a manual delivery and establishing the necessary exclusive possession by the donee. It is important to note that the
claimant acted merely in her confidential capacity as nurse and housekeeper in depositing the papers, and that such act was not necessarily
operative as a donee's acceptance of manual delivery. Considering this in
relation to the requirement that such claims, asserted after the alleged
donor's decease, be sustained by clear and satisfactory evidence of every
element requisite to constitute a gift, 9 the present decision indicates a
somewhat liberal tendency in interpretation of the requirement of clear and
satisfactory proof. The additional circumstance of a confidential relatiopship should have increased the claimant's burden of clear and satisfactory
proof.1o On the other hand, a Michigan case' 1 held a father's written
assignment of a mortgage and note to his son to be a valid gift although
the instruments had been kept in a joint safe deposit box and no showing
was made of exclusive possession by the son. The father had also reserved
the right to the income. Some weight was given, however, to the family
relationship, a distinction which has also been drawn in a recent Florida
case.12 Thus the Court in the present case has some substantiation for its
liberal decision.
Therefore, if it be said that the requirement of delivery is met by showing overt manifestations of the donor's intent to make the transfer, this
decision may be more easily explained than by adherence to the former
requirement of a final and irrevocable surrender of dominion.
WiN-mvR

L. WENTWORTH

7Reil v. Wempe, 145 Md. 448, 125 AUt. 738 (1924).

8Janes v. Janes, 153 Fla. 716, 15 So.2d 677 (1943).
'Garner v. Bemis, 81 Fla. 60, 87 So. 426 (1921).
"Wilkins v. Wilkins, 141 Fla. 188, 192 So. 791 (1939); Rich v. Hailman, 106
Fla. 348, 143 So. 292 (1932).

"Jackman v. Jackman, 271 Mich. 585, 260 N. W. 769 (1935).
"Rappaport v. Kalstein, 156 Fla. 722, 24 So.2d 301 (1946).
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